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Abstract
A feature present in countries with a National Health Service is the co−existence of a public
and a private sector. Often, the public payer contracts with private providers while holding
idle capacity. This is often seen as inefficiency from the management of public facilities. We
present here a different rationale for the existence of such idle capacity: the public sector may
opt to have idle capacity as a way to gain bargaining power vis−à−vis the private provider,
under the assumption of a more efficient private than the public sector.
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1. Introduction.
A feature present in countries with a National Health Service is the co-existence
of a public and a private sector. Often, the public payer contracts with private
providers while holding idle capacity. This is often seen as inefficiency from
the management of public facilities.1 We present here a different rationale for the
existence of such idle capacity: the public sector may opt to have idle capacity as a
way to gain bargaining power vis-a`-vis the private provider, under the assumption
of a more efficient private than the public sector.
2. The model.
We consider a setting where a third-party payer, say a National Health Service
(NHS), has to negotiate prices of health care services with providers. We assume,
for the moment, zero production costs in the provision of health care and the
existence of two providers. We assume away capacity constraints in provision in
the private sector. The public sector may, or may not, be capacity constrained.
Both situations will be treated below.
Price negotiation is carried out under the assumption that providers join a sec-
toral or professional association.2 The association negotiates the price with the
NHS. The negotiation outcome is described by the Nash bargaining solution. In
the case of failure to reach an agreement, both providers compete in the market.
Competition takes place on price. Since we consider cases where demand is es-
sentially exogeneous and has to be fully satisfied, this is a more natural assumption
than quantity competition.3 We assume providers to be characterized by horizon-
tal product differentiation as perceived by the consumer. Differentiation can be
1For a review of several countries, see Busse and Howorth (1999), Crainich and Closon (1999),
Engelbert (1999), Lancry and Sandier (1999), for example.
2A discussion of alternative assumptions can be found in Barros and Martinez-Giralt (2004,
2005).
3We assume that even in the presence of an association, providers do not collude. We will
discuss this assumption later.
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due to geographical distance and/or subjective preferences of the consumer, for
example. This means that we model market interaction as a Hotelling product
differentiation situation. Providers are located at the endpoints of a segment [0,1].
Patients are uniformly distributed along the line, with unit mass.
Consumers are insured and face a copayment rate s. This assumption is in-
nocuous for the analysis. Actually, all the qualitative results hold for any value
s ∈ (0, 1). Note that s = 1 implies no insurance to patients, which would be
contradictory with the role of the third-party payer.
The NHS has a budget M from which it must pay providers. Having free
funds is positively valued by the NHS as it allows for its productive application
elsewhere in the health sector. The gain to the NHS from the negotiation is given
by the difference in the net surplus under negotiation and in the case of failure.
We denote by R such value net of the fallback value. In our simple model, given
the assumption that a positive level of insurance coverage is always guaranteed
to patients, it will be the payment to be made by the NHS to ensure provision in
the private market plus the value, in monetary terms, of the extra insurance level
provided to patients (a copayment s).4
We assume profits of both providers to be equally weighted in the objective
function of the association. An alternative assumption would be to assume that
the more efficient provider has a larger influence in the association’s objectives.
This would leave the qualitative results unchanged, as it would fall between our
two polar cases.
The setting we have in mind has a first-stage with the public sector decides
its capacity and a second stage, in which price bargaining occurs. The model is
solved, as usual, by backward induction.
Before introducing the role of capacity, we need to detail a couple of relevant
4See Barros and Martinez-Giralt (2005) for a formal derivation.
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values. Denote by Πi, i = A,B the profits of each provider and by Π¯i; i = A,B
in the case of negotiation failure. Profits are then given by
ΠA = xpA, ΠB = (1− x)pB,
where pi, i = A,B, is the price received by each provider and x is the patient




− s(pA − pB)
2t
.
Parameter t reflects product differentiation, and it is modeled as the (linear) “trans-
port cost” of not consulting the most preferred type of provider.5
Let µ > 0 be the marginal cost of treatment in the public sector.6 In the ab-
sence of capacity constraints and equal efficiency in public and private facilities,
only public sector treatment would be provided by the third-party payer. For the
problem to be interesting from an economic perspective, we introduce the assump-
tion of a less efficient public sector. The two-stage game is solved by backward
induction.
Let κ be the capacity installed and m the capacity used, m < κ. The cost of
capacity building is φ(κ), increasing and convex in κ. We consider a population
of patients with size 1. Whenever κ > m in equilibrium, we say that the public
sector is not capacity constrained.
The net surplus for the providers is given by the difference of serving (1 −
m) patients at the agreed price p and serving (1 − κ) at the free private market
equilibrium price. On the third-party payer side, the surplus from the agreement
is given by
M − p(1−m)− µm (1)
5See a textbook treatment such as Tirole (1988).
6As the marginal cost of treatment in the private sector is zero by normalization, µ is best
viewed as the difference in efficiency between private and public practice.
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asm patients are treated in the public sector at cost µ and the remaining are treated
in the private sector at price p. If negotiations fail, the fallback value of the third-
party payer is:
M − p˜(1− κ)(1− s)− κµ (2)
where p˜ is the price paid by the patients that exceed public sector capacity, of
which the third-party payer reimburses a fraction 1 − s. Thus, the price from the
second-stage bargaining problem solves
max
p
Ω = (µκ + (1− κ)(1− s)p˜−mµ− (1−m)p)δ ×
× ((1−m)p− (1− κ)p˜)1−δ (3)
Note that the bargaining procedure, in this particular case, divides between the
providers and the third-party payer the cost savings from producing in the private
sector, (κ−m)µ, minus the cost-shifting to patients in case of negotiations failure,
s(1− κ)p˜.
Solving for the equilibrium price yields:7
p = (1− δ)κ−m
1−mµ +
1− κ
1−mp˜(1− (1− δ)s) (4)
The value of p˜ is given by the private market equilibrium when patients pay a
fraction s of the price. Thus, p˜ = t/s.
We now consider the first stage, the capacity installed and its utilization. These
decisions take into account the continuation of the game, and how the negotiated
price will be affected by them.
The objective function of the third-party payer is the surplus generated, taking
into account the game continuation:
S = M −mµ− (1−m)p(κ,m)− φ(κ) (5)
7In addition, we must require that each player has a positive gain from engaging in the negoti-
ation. This requirement implies µ(k −m)− (1− κ)sp˜ > 0.
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where p is the equilibrium price of the negotiation stage, and therefore depends
on both κ andm. It turns out that
∂S
∂m
= −µδ < 0 (6)
Hence, the optimal capacity utilization is, in this case, zero. On the other hand,
∂S
∂k
= [δp˜− (1− δ)(µ− p˜(1− s))]− φ′(κ) (7)
Whenever the term in square brackets is positive, there will a positive equilibrium
value for capacity, which will be kept idle. The only reason to build capacity
here is the strategic effect associated with the negotiation stage. Increasing κ
reduces the fallback value of the providers, valued at the margin by p˜. This helps in
obtaining a lower price in the negotiation stage. On the other hand, it may reduce
or increase the fallback value of the third-party payer, as it depends on whether
using the extra capacity costs more than using the private market. That is, if µ >
(1− s)p˜, the third-party payer would prefer to buy in the private market.8 Each of
these marginal changes in the fallback values resulting from capacity decisions are
weighted by the bargaining power of each side. Of course, if the cost difference
between public and private treatment is sufficiently high, the optimal capacity may
well be zero in the public sector, and there will be a capacity constraint. However,
the important point we want to convey is that the public sector may choose to have
slack as a way to improve its negotiation terms. Naturally, this only has value if
there is some gain from using the private sector vis-a`-vis public facilities.
3. Concluding remarks.
We showed, in a very simple model, that idle capacity in public sector health care
provision may have a economic rationale: increasing bargaining power against
8We assume that it is credible that in case of negotiations failure, the public sector will use
all its capacity. If this was not the case, the only equilibrium price would be the private market
equilibrium price.
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private providers that contract with the public payer. The argument is akin to
the Dixit-Spence excessive capacity result, where a firm builds extra capacity as
a commitment to be aggressive in the market.9. The idle capacity works as a
commitment to extract more surplus from more efficient private providers that ne-
gotiate prices with the public payer. Therefore, empirical assessments of the role
of idle capacity in the public sector must take into account whether negotatiations
with the private sector exist.
9Dixit (1979, 1980), Spence (1977, 1979)
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